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FORESEEABILITY AND COPYRIGHT INCENTIVES
Shyamkrishna Balganesh†

Copyright law‟s principal justification has for long been the theory of creator incentives. Creators are
presumed to be rational utility-maximizers and therefore induced to create by the mere prospect of
controlling a future market for their yet-to-be-created works. Yet, current copyright doctrine does
surprisingly little to give effect to this theory. None of its doctrines enable courts to circumscribe a
creator‟s entitlement by reference to the idea of incentives and the limitations inherent therein. As a
consequence, copyright‟s grant of exclusivity is presumed to extend to all markets and uses for a work,
whether or not they were capable of forming any part of a creator‟s incentive. Limitless incentives thus
translate into unbounded entitlements.
Through its allocation of costs and benefits, the common law too relies on providing actors with
incentives to behave in certain ways. Unlike copyright law however, the common law recognizes the
existence of a clear outer limit to its incentive structure and attempts to give effect to this limit through
the concept of „foreseeability‟. Premised on the idea that individuals are incapable of cognitively
processing consequences that are temporally or causally far removed from their actions, foreseeability
requires courts to eliminate from the liability calculus certain low-probability occurrences when they
are unlikely to have influenced an individual‟s decision at the time of action. Foreseeability thus
represents a cognition-based doctrinal limit to the behavioral modification that the common law
attempts to induce.
This Article argues that if copyright law is to remain true to its theory of incentives, it needs to pay
closer attention to the way in which incentives actually influence creative decision-making and
internalize the idea that creators, like actors elsewhere, are subject to cognitive imperfections that in
turn limit the effectiveness of incentives. To this end, it proposes a test of „foreseeable copying‟ to limit
copyright‟s grant of exclusivity to situations where a copier‟s use was reasonably foreseeable to the
creator at the time of creation —the point when the incentive is meant to operate. Adopting a test of
foreseeability is thus likely to better align copyright law with its underlying purpose and provide courts
with a mechanism by which to give effect to copyright‟s theory of incentives in individual cases —
thereby according it more than just rhetorical significance.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A

s an instrumentally driven entitlement, copyright has its limits. If, as most agree,
copyright law‘s primary purpose lies in providing individuals with an incentive to
generate creative expression, its grant of exclusivity must be limited by that purpose. 1
Yet, rarely ever do courts look to copyright‘s incentive structure in delineating its scope.
They routinely assume that its property-like nature automatically entitles its holder to
internalize all possible benefits associated with the work —whether or not the creator
was responsible for them beyond just creating the work. This issue becomes most
pressing in cases involving markets for new uses —that either employ the work in the
context of a new technology or creatively employ the work for an altogether new
purpose.2
An overwhelmingly large number of copyright cases, both historically and in the
recent past, have involved markets for new uses —most prominently, uses involving new
technologies.3 The printing press, photocopiers, cable retransmission, audio and video
1

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (―To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996) (―To encourage
authors to create and disseminate original expression, it accords them a bundle of proprietary rights in their
works.‖).
2
For a discussion of new uses in the context of new technologies see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control
over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001).
3
See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1995) (discussing the
emergence of copyright in the era of the printing press); BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 101-25 (1967) (discussing the historical evolution of copyright in light of different technologies). For
prominent cases that faced the question of markets for new uses see White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,
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recorders, digital conversion and file-sharing, to name a few, each presented copyright
law with a somewhat identical question: does a copyright owner‘s exclusive rights in a
work extend to its use with a new technology that wasn‘t in existence when the work was
created? A somewhat similar issue often arises in relation to derivative works as well,
where an existent work is modified to create an altogether new one. 4 On most occasions,
courts answer this in the affirmative, effectively allowing copyright-holders to control the
development and direction of the new use and thereby the market for it. Occasionally
though, they have refused to do so, preferring to draw a limit to copyright‘s exclusivity
and recognizing that a creator‘s entitlement doesn‘t extend to the new use.5 Yet in doing
so, they have struggled to articulate a coherent forward-looking principle on which to
justify the refusal.6
Of the various theories commonly advanced to justify copyright law, the
utilitarian incentive-based one continues to dominate —among scholars, judges and
policy-makers.7 In this view, copyright exists primarily (if not entirely) to provide
creators with an incentive to produce creative expression through the promise of limited
exclusionary control over their creative work. Creators are presumed to be rational
utility-maximizers and therefore capable of being induced to create by the prospect of
controlling a future market for their yet-to-be-created works. For all its reliance on the
idea of creator incentives though, copyright law does very little to instantiate the idea of
incentives into its entitlement-delineation process. None of copyright‘s current doctrinal
devices enable courts to circumscribe a creator‘s entitlement by reference to the incentive
structure that the institution is premised on. As a direct consequence, creators (and their
assignees) are often thought to be ‗rightfully entitled‘ to any revenue stream associated
with their creation, whether or not it owes its existence solely to the creator and
regardless of it having been developed well after the creation of the work.
As should be obvious, the utilitarian justification for copyright is premised on the
standard neoclassical economic assumptions of rational choice theory. As in other
contexts, individuals are deemed perfectly rational, their preferences identifiable and
transitive, and they are believed to readily respond to utility-enhancing incentives.8 For
quite some time now however, the field of behavioral economics has systematically
questioned several of these assumptions, and has somewhat more recently begun to
209 U.S. 1 (1908) (dealing with the market for piano-rolls); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,
392 U.S. 390 (1968) (dealing with cable retransmissions); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984) (dealing with the video recorder); Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int‘l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir.
2002) (dealing with the photographic cataloging of plush toys); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92
F.Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dealing with the market for digital music); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d
811 (9th Cir. 2003) (dealing with the market for thumbnails of copyrighted photographs). Perhaps the best
known cases in the recent past include those pending against Google. See McGraw-Hill Co. v. Google, Inc., No.
05 CV 8881 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 19, 2005); The Authors‘ Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Sept. 20, 2005).
4
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2005).
5
See Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415
U.S. 394 (1974); RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (1999).
6
See Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1616 (noting courts‘ inconsistency in articulating a basis for these decisions).
7
See infra Part I.
8
See generally Robert Frank, Departures from Rational Choice: With and Without Regret, in The LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 13 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
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provide legal scholars and policy-makers with new ways in which to understand and
reformulate the standard economic analysis of law.9 Much of behavioral economics is
centered around the idea of ‗bounded rationality‘ —the belief that human cognitive
abilities are limited.10 Consequently, individual decision-making takes place under
conditions of limited knowledge and limited information processing.11 Since individuals
are either unable or unlikely to anticipate all future contingencies associated with their
actions in advance, they only ever factor some of them into their decisions to act.
Cognitive imperfections thus result in incomplete predictions.
Interestingly though, the common law has for long come to recognize the
existence of cognitive limits to human predictive capacities and has additionally
attempted to guard against it. Its principal device to this end remains the concept of
foreseeability.12 In its simplest formulation, foreseeability restricts a party‘s recovery by
limiting either a plaintiff‘s entitlement or a defendant‘s liability to events and
consequences that were objectively capable of being anticipated at a certain point in
time.13
In each of the contexts where the common law employs foreseeability as a
limiting device, its basis for doing so remains somewhat similar. As a process, the
common law is both backward- and forward-looking. On the one hand, it allocates the
costs arising from a certain event, but at the same time it attempts to induce parties to
behave in certain ways in order to avoid those costs and at times obtain benefits.14 In this
latter guidance-function, it looks to how individuals behave in different contexts and
formulates a set of incentives (entitlements) and deterrents (liability) to direct their future
actions.15 Foreseeability, builds here on notions of bounded rationality. When certain
events or consequences could not have formed any part of an actor‘s decisions for an
action, the law characterizes them as ‗unforeseeable‘ and avoids attributing them to the
actor. In economic terms, foreseeability thus enables courts to sift between events that
could have formed part of an actor‘s ex ante incentives for action and those that couldn‘t,
thereby restricting recovery for the former alone.
Copyright law much like the common law, is concerned with inducing behavior
of a certain kind by incentivizing it. By providing creators with an ex post reward, it
attempts to incentivize their ex ante production of creative expression. As a property
entitlement arising from the bilateral context, its similarity to other areas of the common
law is more than apparent. If the law (in other contexts) readily presumes that rational
9

For some pioneering work in the area see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051
(2000); Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747 (1998).
10
See supra Section III.A. See also id. at 1477.
11
See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 79-109 (3d ed. 1976).
12
Most prominent among these areas has of course been its use in tort law. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE
FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 59 (2d ed. 2002); 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.9,
at 466 (2d ed. 1989); Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961). For an
analysis of its use in other contexts See infra Section III.B.
13
See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 743 (2005).
14
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1984)
(describing these as the ―ex ante‖ and ―ex post‖ perspectives respectively).
15
See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS __ (2d ed. 1989).
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actors can only ever factor ‗foreseeable‘ consequences into their decision-making
process, logically speaking, copyright law should see little need to give creators an
entitlement to unforeseeable ones. If the law remains cognizant of the limits to any
behavioral modification that its scheme of incentives can produce in other areas,
copyright law should see little reason not to do the same. Copyright‘s theory of incentives
thus needs to internalize the idea of bounded rationality and with it, a doctrinal
mechanism by which to eliminate un-incentivized gains from a creator‘s entitlement.
In this Article, I argue that following from the common law‘s adherence to the
model of bounded rationality in other contexts through its use of foreseeability, copyright
law ought to employ a test of foreseeability to determine the point up to which a
copyright owner should be allowed to internalize the gains from his work. In determining
liability for infringement, applying a test of foreseeability would require a court to ask
whether the use complained of is one which the copyright owner (i.e., the plaintiff) could
have foreseen at the time that the work was created (i.e., the point when the entitlement
commences). Adopting an approach along these lines is likely to present courts with a
solution to the problem of markets for new uses, and a rational basis on which to mark
the outer boundaries of copyright‘s grant of exclusive rights —questions that have
hitherto been resolved entirely on an ad hoc basis.
Limiting liability for copyright infringement using foreseeability is also likely to
transform the way in which courts think about and apply the doctrine of fair use. At
present, the primary mechanism of sifting between uses of the work in order to determine
which ones the copyright holder should be allowed to claim an exclusive right over,
remains the doctrine of fair use.16 Courts and scholars have over the years developed
formulations of the doctrine that speak directly to this task, such as ―transformative use‖
and ―intrinsic use‖.17 These formulations suffer from a host of well-documented
problems, almost all of which derive from the structural reality that as a defense to
liability, fair use inevitably focuses on the defendant, ignoring altogether the plaintiff‘s
entitlement and the reasons for it, once the work is brought into existence. Moving these
questions to the issue of liability upfront would serve to mark the outer boundaries of
copyright exclusivity by connecting it to the ex ante incentive that copyright is meant to
generate.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II examines copyright law‘s principal
justificatory theory: the theory of creator incentives. It sets out the core assumptions
16

It remains common consensus among copyright scholars that the fair use doctrine —as it is structured and
applied today— remains deeply flawed. See Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC‘Y U.S.A. 133 (2003); David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use: Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
903 (2005); Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (2007); Lydia Pallas Loren,
Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1 (1997); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975
(2002).
17
See LEON E. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT (1978) (advocating a ―productive use‖ test);
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990) (formulating the ―transformative
use‖ test). The transformative use test was adopted by the Supreme Court shortly after its formulation. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994). Each of these formulations however was to be a
part of the standard four-factor test, which employs other quantitative and qualitative considerations. See, e.g.,
Leval, supra, at 1111.
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central to it, analyzes the failure of copyright doctrine to instantiate its avowed reliance
on it and lays out the consequence of this failure. It thus attempts to make the case for a
new limiting device within copyright law that recognizes how incentives are capable of
impacting actual decision-making among creators. Part III illustrates how the idea of
foreseeability—used in other contexts to structure actor incentives and limit windfalls—
can serve that very purpose. It begins by looking to the idea of bounded rationality (III.A)
and proceeds to analyze foreseeability‘s use in different areas of the law, all in
recognition of the limited behavioral modification the law expects to induce (III.B). Part
IV then attempts to introduce foreseeability to copyright law using a test of ‗foreseeable
copying‘. It starts by setting out how the test would operate as part of the infringement
inquiry (IV.A). It then proceeds to argue that a test of foreseeability remains perfectly
compatible with copyright‘s theory of incentives and in many ways is mandated by it
(IV.B) and finally illustrates how in the copyright context, courts do in fact routinely
employ an objective test of foreseeability in other contexts, as a consequence of which,
extending it to the infringement inquiry is likely to present few issues of workability
(IV.C). Part V responds to three potential objections to the use of foreseeability as a
principle in copyright law, while Part VI concludes.
Behavioral economics, an emerging alternative to standard neoclassical theory is
likely to provide intellectual property law with numerous insights into the intricacies of
creative decision-making and the ways in which individuals are likely to respond to
different stimuli.18 The present attempt to introduce foreseeability —a bounded
rationality-influenced device— into copyright law is but a modest effort to try and apply
one of the basic ideas of behavioral economics to the legal regulation of creative
decision-making. The validity of this larger project will of course come to depend on
further empirical validation. It is hoped that this Article will nevertheless help lay out the
theoretical framework for such future endeavors by examining what the copyright system
might look like if it were to internalize the idea of bounded rationality into its doctrinal
apparatus.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW AND CREATOR INCENTIVES
As a property right —understood as a set of exclusive use privileges protected by
an exclusionary right— copyright is premised on the idea of allowing its holder to

18

Behavioral economics is yet to make sufficient headway into the area of intellectual property law. For some
early work, in different contexts see: Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 2020 (2005) (examining the impact of behavioral work on elements of trademark law); James Gibson, Risk
Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (examining how risk
averse behavior impacts licensing practices and thereby entitlement-delineation in intellectual property
generally); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias
Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006) (examining how hindsight bias impacts the
non-obviousness determination in patent cases); Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentives to Create under a
“Lifetime-Plus-Years” Copyright Duration: Lessons from a Behavioral Economic Analysis of Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 36 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 437 (2002) (examining how the optimism and sub-additivity biases impact
creators under different copyright terms).
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capture (or internalize) the benefits associated with the use of his/her work.19 In spite of
its being a property right though, its scope and reach remain significantly limited. Using a
host of internal doctrines, copyright law limits the circumstances and ways in which an
owner is permitted to exercise its grant of exclusivity.20
While personality- and desert-based theories of copyright abound in the literature,
copyright law in the United States has undeniably come to be understood almost entirely
in utilitarian, incentive-driven terms.21 Copyright law is thus thought to exist primarily to
give authors (i.e., creators) an incentive to create and thereafter distribute their works
publicly. What is perhaps unique though about copyright law is that in spite of its avowed
adherence to this theory of incentives, its internal doctrinal devices do little to give effect
to its theoretical basis. Copyright doctrine thus strays far from instantiating the
institution‘s broader purpose.
Limiting a party‘s liability or entitlement by reference to its underlying purpose is
hardly novel. Tort law routinely does this. In the statutory context, this process is rather
well-known in antitrust law. As part of the ‗antitrust injury rule‘, courts there ask whether
the injury complained of by a plaintiff was of ―the type the antitrust laws were intended
to prevent‖ and arose as a consequences of ―that which makes the defendant‘s acts
unlawful‖.22 Yet courts in interpreting and developing different formulations of
copyright‘s doctrinal devices rarely ever make reference to incentives.
A. Copyright‟s Theory of Limitless Incentives
Central to all of copyright law is the idea of incentives. 23 Copyright exists to
provide creators with an incentive to create and disseminate their works publicly. Courts
and scholars alike seem to take this proposition for granted.24 In this view, copyright law
promises authors a right to sue others who use their creation in a way that interferes with

19

For an overview of the copyright-property linkage see JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS:
LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996); Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete
Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1046 (2006).
20
See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry in the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1365-77 (1989). Some of these doctrines include: the ideaexpression dichotomy, the originality requirement, the rule of fixation and the temporally limited nature of the
grant. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2005).
21
Indeed, this instrumental mandate derives from copyright‘s constitutional origins. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8 (―To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖).
22
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1989).
23
See Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003).
24
See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (1996); Mark
A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997); F.
Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 301
(2001); Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 724 (2003). See also Harper &
Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1975).
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their ability to profit from it.25 The promise of exclusivity in the market for the creative
work is thus taken to operate as an inducement for its very production.
Beyond this though, the incentive theory tells us very little. Yet, underlying it
remain several minor premises that are rarely ever analyzed in any detail. For the promise
of market-exclusivity or a share in profits to operate as an incentive, creators need to be
rational utility-maximizers. The possibility of maximizing their utility functions
associated with their creative work is thought to induce them into devoting the necessary
time and effort into the creative process. In addition, the inducement is thought to operate
as a ‗but-for‘ reason for the creator‘s actions. In other words, the theory assumes that but
for the inducement (i.e., without copyright), creators would lack sufficient motivation and
reason to engage in the creative process to begin with.26
The incentive provided by copyright‘s promise of exclusivity is also thought to
correlate directly with the overall production of creative expression. Thus, greater the
incentive, greater the number of creative works produced without a readily identifiable
upper limit. What further contributes to this idea is a process that some refer to as the
―incentive-expectation circularity‖.27 The scope and extent of creators‘ incentives come
to be equated with their overall expectations, which often have no independent basis, and
as a consequence continue to expand outward without any identifiable limit. Given
copyright‘s system of ex post entitlement delineation in the infringement setting, the law
presumes that since creators have already created the work, the market they seek to
control via the infringement action was unquestionably a part of their original incentive.
Copyright‘s incentive structure in this formulation then, is presumptively limitless.
The limitlessness of copyright‘s incentive theory is generally attributed to the
influence of neoclassical and new institutional economic thinking on copyright law and
policy.28 Its impact on copyright‘s entitlement structure, though diffused, is most
pervasive. By presuming that any market —however causally or temporally removed it
may be from the creator‘s actions— that employs the work, naturally formed part of the
author‘s incentive in creating it, it allocates exclusive control over that market to the
author. Economic thinking apart though, one suspects that a major contributing factor to
this presumptive limitlessness lies in copyright doctrine‘s failure to instantiate its theory
of incentives in any meaningful way. Since courts do not have a device by which to give
effect to a limit even if they were to recognize the need for one, the topic of limits rarely
ever enters the discussion.
B. The Absence of Purpose-Driven Limits in Copyright Law
Despite its being premised on the idea of incentives, courts never look to
copyright‘s theory of incentives in delineating the scope and extent of a creator‘s
entitlement. To the extent that they do ever make reference to incentives, they do so to

25

See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1385 (1989).
26
See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time, 101 MICH L. REV. 409, 428 (2002).
27
See Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433 (2007).
28
Netanel, supra note __, at 308-13.
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examine whether a finding of no liability is likely to negatively impact future incentives,
when ironically enough, the structure of this incentive isn‘t ever determined up front.29
Copyright remains distinct from other forms of intellectual property, in that the
absence of an administrative grant-making entity (such as the PTO) ensures that it falls
entirely to courts to delineate the scope and extent of a creator‘s entitlement. In its most
basic sense, copyright‘s entitlement lies in its promise of exclusivity, a promise that is
legally enforceable against interference by third parties. Since courts remain the primary
(or rather, sole) determinants of this entitlement in any given situation, they both validate
the entitlement and then enforce it through either a property or liability rule. The process
of validation usually entails examining whether the work in question meets the eligibility
requirements to be protected, while the enforcement process then circumscribes the
entitlement by reference to the defendant‘s actions. Both processes operate as limits on
the entitlement. While the latter is correlative, the former is in a sense absolute.30 Yet,
none of the doctrinal devices that courts use in either process attempts to connect the
entitlement to its underlying purpose.
Copyright‘s absolute limiting doctrines concern themselves most directly with the
need to limit a creator‘s monopoly power in order to minimize the deadweight losses
associated with its exercise.31 Thus devices such as the ―idea-expression dichotomy‖ and
originality/creativity serve to curtail a copyright holder‘s monopoly, but do so in
recognition of the social costs associated with overbroad protection rather than out of a
realization that creator incentives aren‘t warranted in the area. Indeed one might even
argue that rules such as the originality/creativity requirement, in attempting to reduce
creators‘ monopolies, run contrary to copyright‘s theory of incentives.32
Copyright law‘s correlative limiting devices on the other hand seem better placed
to internalize its incentive theory. Since they involve determining the outer boundaries of
a creator‘s entitlement only by reference to a specific action (i.e., the defendant‘s), they
might be used to eliminate from the scope of the entitlement, actions that weren‘t part of
the incentive. Yet, neither of its two principal correlative doctrines —substantial
similarity and fair use— rely on copyright‘s attempt to induce creativity.
1. Substantial Similarity. — As part of the infringement inquiry, the law requires a
plaintiff to establish that the defendant copied the protected work in his actions.33 Absent
copying, liability for copyright infringement is practically non-existent.34 While copying
29

See, e.g., Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 598 (1994).
30
By correlative here, I mean that the inquiry is done relationally, by reference to the plaintiff and the defendant.
The idea of correlativity is generally used to describe tort law‘s entitlement structure, where liability is an
attempt to connect the defendant‘s actions to the plaintiff‘s harm through the law‘s underlying normative goals.
Ernest Weinrib‘s account of correlativity is perhaps the most widely accepted exposition of the idea. See ERNEST
J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1996); Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract
Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (2003).
31
See Sterk, supra note __, at 1210-13 (1996).
32
Id. at 1221, 1220-22 (―[T]he Court‘s opinion [in Feist] is entirely inconsistent with the incentive justification
for copyright.‖).
33
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.01[B] (2007); Perris v. Hexamer, 99
U.S. 674, 675 (1879).
34
2 id. § 8.01[A](―[A]bsent copying, there can be no infringement of copyright, regardless of the extent of
similarity.‖).
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certainly does entail a factual element (i.e., whether the defendant took elements of the
plaintiff‘s work), it involves more than just that and carries with it a significant normative
dimension.35 This is in the form of the rule of substantial similarity, or as some call it,
―actionable copying‖.36
The requirement of substantial similarity requires a plaintiff to establish not just
that the works in question are similar, but that the similarity relates to the fundamental
essence or structure of the work.37 It thus entails establishing that what the defendant took
from the plaintiff‘s work is protected by copyright law to begin with. As one court sought
to define the process:
The traditional test for substantial similarity is whether the accused work is so similar to
the plaintiff‘s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant
unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff‘s protectable expression by taking material of
substance and value.38

This definition is replete with subjective terms of art (―ordinary reasonable person‖,
―unlawfully appropriated‖, ―substance and value‖), each of which require further
elucidation for the definition to be complete —aptly indicative of the complexity that the
process entails.39 All the same, courts have over the years, sought to develop myriad
formulations of the test, to be applied to individual cases.
In attempting to classify these different formulations, Nimmer usefully divides
them into two broad categories. The first, which he calls ―comprehensive nonliteral
similarity‖, involves situations where the essence of the work is copied, even if the
copying isn‘t literal (i.e., verbatim).40 Here, the tests all focus on extracting the essence of
the plaintiff‘s work without running afoul of the idea-expression dichotomy, and then
examining whether the defendant‘s work copied the same. The second category,
―fragmented literal similarity‖, involves cases where the defendant‘s work uses parts of
the plaintiff‘s.41 The copying is literal (i.e., verbatim), but partial and dispersed.
Substantial similarity here, Nimmer argues, cannot be decided except by reference to the
defendant‘s purpose behind the copying, which unfortunately is a question usually
reserved for the fair use inquiry.42 Consequently, courts usually focus on whether what
the defendant took was of significant value to the plaintiff‘s (not defendant‘s) work, for it
to be characterized as substantial.
35

4 id. § 13.01[B] (noting that ―few courts or commentators have historically differentiated‖ between them).
Id. § 13.01[A].
37
ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW §1.1, at 11(2003).
38
Country Kids ‗N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996).
39
See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note __, § 1.1, at 1-2 (―Substantial similarity is an elusive concept.‖).
See also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (where Judge Learned
Hand notes that the determination must ―inevitably be ad hoc‖).
40
See 4 NIMMER, supra note __, §13.03[A][1].
41
Id. §13.03[A][2].
42
Id. He notes that as a consequence, the line between the two requirements often gets blurred. But see Nelson v.
PRN Prod., Inc., 873 F.2d 1141, 1143 (1989) (rejecting an attempt to conflate the two and alter the burden of
proof).
36
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What should be most apparent from these tests though, is that the substantial
similarity test focuses almost entirely on comparing the works themselves.43 To the
limited extent that it looks to the defendant‘s use or purpose, it does so exclusively to
compare the components of the two similar works.44 Nowhere does it look to the
plaintiff‟s purpose or intent in creating the work, to elucidate a possible incentive and
compare it in turn to the defendant‘s. Thus, while it relates the defendant‘s (infringing)
work to the plaintiff‘s protected one, any inquiry into copyright‘s overall purpose (in
general or in specific) is considered altogether extraneous.
2. Fair Use. — Questions of purpose are ordinarily understood as being a part of the
fair use inquiry. Using a list of four statutorily delineated non-determinative factors,
courts are given significant leeway to conclude that a defendant‘s use of the copyrighted
work is insufficiently harmful to the plaintiff‘s interests.45 While the fair use inquiry was
originally meant to focus on parties‘ purposes (in using the work), in practice it too places
large reliance on the amount and significance of the defendant‘s copying, with the result
that an independent substantial similarity requirement often becomes superfluous, or
subsumed within the fair use inquiry.
Further, even as a recognized limit on a creator‘s property interest (in the
expression), fair use exhibits several structural infirmities. Perhaps most important of
these, lies in its being an ‗affirmative defense‘, meaning that the burden is placed on the
defendant to prove that his use satisfies some or all of the statutory requirements.46 This
is unlike even the rule of substantial similarity, which as part of the infringement inquiry
is a recognized part of the plaintiff‘s burden. The doctrine thus works to limit the
copyright grant by depending entirely on the defendant‘s ability to convince a court that
his activities are unlikely to impact a creator‘s otherwise protected interest. The copyright
owner is thus deemed entitled to internalize all possible benefits, until the fair use
determination concludes otherwise.47 In focusing on this presumptive entitlement, by
itself, fair use does very little in practice to link the defendant‘s actions (i.e., copying)
with the creator‘s original incentive.
While the doctrine of fair use is of statutory origin, its intrinsic open-endedness
has resulted in few general principles being discernible in both its theory and practice.
Courts have often characterized it to be the ―most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole

43

See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note __, at 2-1 (observing that substantial similarity always entails a
―comparison of the works‖).
44
The substantial similarity requirement is applied even to derivative works, which by their very nature involve a
different purpose, pointing to the general irrelevance of the purpose and use to which the work is put. See id. at
15-1.
45
See 17 U.S.C. 107 (2005). In general terms the four factors are: (i) the purpose and character of the defendant‘s
use; (ii) the nature of the protected work; (iii) the amount and substantiality of the portion of the work used; and
(iv) its impact on the actual and potential market for the protected work.
46
3 NIMMER, supra note __, at § 12.11[F].
47
Thus if the defendant were not to raise the defense, courts would operate on the assumption that the plaintiff is
entitled to control the market that the defendant is operating in. For a recent example see Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). There, the defendant agreed not
to raise the defense of fair use, id. at 616, with the consequence that the court merely had to conclude that the
defendants had copied or performed the plaintiff‘s work. See id. at 616, 622.
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law of copyright48‖ and as ―defy[ing] definition49‖. Yet, a few specific formulations stand
out, which might be thought to have some connection to copyright‘s incentive structure.
(a) Transformative Use/Purpose. — Since the first part of the fair use test revolves
around the ‗purpose‘ for which the defendant uses the protected work,50 some have
suggested that courts look beyond just the binary commercial/non-commercial distinction
to answer this question. The ‗transformative use‘ test requires courts to examine whether
a use complained of is transformative, in its being ―productive‖ and ―employ[ing] the
[protected] matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original‖.51
Under this approach, courts are to see if the defendant‘s use adds value to the plaintiff‘s
original use —value being understood of course, outside of its purely commercial sense.52
At first glance, one might see ‗transformative use‘ as having some connection to
creator incentives, especially in its reliance on parties‘ purpose in using the work. If a
defendant‘s use is so different (i.e., transformative) from the plaintiff‘s, one might think it
illogical to conclude that the possibility of controlling it was any part of the plaintiff‘s ex
ante incentive. In reality though, the purpose is only ever understood through the content,
and never as an independent variable.53 Thus, for uses that don‘t directly modify the
substantive content of the work, the transformative use test becomes somewhat
meaningless.54 New uses that involve merely converting an existent work into hitherto
unforeseen media forms or that employ large portions of it within a broader business
model (e.g. Google‘s Library Project55) are unlikely to satisfy even the widest possible
understanding of transformative use.56
Transformative use, as it is understood today then, does nothing to connect fair
use to a creator‘s incentive. The overbearing emphasis placed on the work itself, and the
rendering of the ‗purpose‘ element of the test practically meaningless, aptly reflect this.
(b) Market Failure. — The second, and perhaps more influential attempt to give the
fair use doctrine a rational basis employs an economic model of market failure and is

48

Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 475; Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Doc. Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996); Time, Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
50
17 U.S.C. §107(1) (2005).
51
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
52
Id. The Supreme Court endorsed Judge Leval‘s test in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., drawing a
distinction between superseding and transformative uses of the work based on market substitution. 510 U.S. 569
(1994). See generally Christopher Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155
U. PENN. L. REV. 635, 711-12 (2007).
53
See Matt Williams, Recent Second Circuit Opinions Indicate that Google‟s Library Project is Not
Transformative, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 318 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme Court‘s decision in
Campbell is necessarily restricted to such an examination).
54
See id. at 319-30; Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); Blanch v.
Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). But see Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that a new use for a pre-existent work that didn‘t modify the underlying expression was sufficiently
transformative); Williams, supra note __, at 317-19 (characterizing the Kelly court‘s use of the standard to be a
―misapplication‖).
55
See Jonathan Band, The Google Library Project: Both Sides of the Story, 1 PLAGIARY 1, 3-7 (2007) (describing
Google‘s fair use argument in the actual litigation).
56
See Williams, supra note __, at 330-32.
49
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usually associated with the work of Wendy Gordon.57 In this conception, the fair use
doctrine exists exclusively to remedy situations of market failure.58
Fair use, in this formulation, is to be permitted by courts only when (i) the
existence of a market failure is shown, (ii) a defendant‘s access to (and use of) the work
is socially desirable, and most important for our purposes, (iii) it would not interfere
substantially with the plaintiff‘s original incentive.59 On the face of it, the market failure
model appears to relate fair use to creators‘ incentives, in its third requirement. On closer
analysis though, it doesn‘t. Much like its assumption about the creator‘s original
entitlement, the model starts from the assumption that a creator‘s incentive lies in
unfettered control over all possible uses and that anything that detracts from such control
is necessarily an interference with it (an ―injury‖). The creator‘s entitlement is thus
thought to consist in all market-based uses of a work and anything short of that is
presumed to be an insufficient inducement. Yet it doesn‘t give us a basis for this, except
in terms of a general preference for authors.60 The market failure model then does little
more than refer to the potential impact that a finding of non-infringement might have on
the incentive, but does little to tell us what the contours of that incentive are.
(c) Time-based Proposals. — More recently others have argued that a commitment to
copyright‘s incentive structure necessitates calibrating the fair use analysis to fluctuations
in the market value for a creative work across its lifespan.61 Justin Hughes, for instance
notes that the fair use analysis needs to look to the present value of a work at the time the
decision was made to invest into its creation or distribution.62 Hughes‘ argument, much
like the preceding analysis recognizes that fair use (in its current iteration) does
absolutely nothing to connect a creator‘s entitlement to his/her ex ante incentive. All the
same, his proposal would do no more than have courts be more accepting of fair use
arguments, as a work grows older, rather than have them concretely adhere to the idea of
creator incentives in constructing the entitlement.63 His solution thus doesn‘t quite force
copyright to ―be true to [its] ex ante incentive structure‖, as he claims it should.64
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See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case
and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). The dissenting opinion (arguing that the defendant‘s use
wasn‘t fair use) would rely on Gordon‘s article. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 478.
58
Id. at 1601; Robin A. Moore, Fair Use and Innovation Policy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 944, 950 (2007).
59
Id. at 1614.
60
The following is perhaps illustrative:
New technologies will make certain copyrighted works more valuable…If copyright protection is
denied because of an otherwise curable market failure, then the additional revenues that would have
flowed from the new technological use will not appear. If the authors‘ revenues fail to reflect the
additional value that new technology gives to such works, then insufficient resources may be drawn
into their creation.
Id. at 1621.
61
See Hughes, supra note __, at 782. A somewhat more elaborate version of the proposal was made around the
same time by Joseph Liu. See Liu, supra note __. Yet, unlike Hughes, Liu bases his proposal not on the need to
bring copyright doctrine closes to its theory of incentives, but rather on the problems associated with the process
of extending copyright‘s term of protection. Id. at 411-12 & n.10 (noting this difference).
62
Hughes, supra note __, at 782-83.
63
Id. at 781-82.
64
Id. at 782.
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(d) Limiting the Elusive Fourth Factor. — Perhaps more importantly though, courts
too have occasionally tried to understand fair use as a purpose-driven limit on creators‘
entitlement. Yet, this purpose has never directly been tied to a creator‘s incentive. In the
context of the fourth fair use factor, which requires identifying a potential market for the
plaintiff‘s work (and the impact on the defendant‘s use on that market),65 plaintiff‘s often
seek to argue that their market includes a market for licenses to use the work. 66 In this
construction, every use of the work by the defendant has a substitutive effect on the
plaintiff‘s market —for even if the plaintiff isn‘t in direct competition with the
defendant‘s use, its ability to license the use certainly is.67
To avoid this circularity, courts have occasionally observed that the market
inquiry needs to be limited to ―traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed‖ markets
for the work.68 All the same, without an identifiable basis by which to identify a market
as ‗traditional‘ or ‗reasonable‘, the limit becomes meaningless. How and more
importantly, when should this determination be made? Courts have thus inconsistently,
based the determination on plaintiffs‘ post-creative (i.e., after creating the work) ability,
motive, interest or expectation to enter a certain market —but never on their ex ante
incentive in creating the work, the inducement that copyright is meant to be about. Unless
‗traditional‘ or ‗reasonable‘ are related back to the time of creation —the point when the
incentive to create is meant to operate— it bears little connection to the idea of creator
incentives.69
Fair use in its myriad formulations, judicial and academic, thus remains a weak
basis by which to limit copyright by reference to its underlying theory of incentives.
Indeed, the complexity and incoherence that its jurisprudence seem to have generated
already, might be an added reason to look elsewhere.
C. The Social Costs of Copyright Windfalls
To sum up, a direct consequence of there being no independent basis by which
courts can relate copyright‘s entitlement structure to its underlying purpose is that
markets that use the work in ways that could not have possibly formed any part of the
65

See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2005) (―[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.‖).
66
See, e.g., Amer. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Princeton Univ. Press, 99
F.3d at 1388; Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
67
For more on this circularity problem see 4 NIMMER, supra note __, at § 13.05[A][4]; Fisher, supra note __, at
1671; Lunney, supra note __, at 1021; Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use
in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 41 (1997); Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as
Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 903-04 (2007); Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in
Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1160 (2000); Mark
Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 190 (2007).
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Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d at 930. See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (using a similar ―normal market‖
criterion).
69
As a historical matter, interestingly, the common law standard seems to have required relating it back to the
time of creation/publication. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550 (observing how fair use was ―predicated on the
author‘s implied consent to ‗reasonable and customary‘ use when he released his work for public consumption‖)
(emphasis supplied).
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creator‘s incentive in creating it, are nonetheless deemed part of the creator‘s
exclusionary entitlement. Uses for a work that are either temporally or causally
disconnected from the creator‘s actions inevitably then get attributed and allocated to the
creator.
In numerous other contexts though, courts and scholars have long characterized
the unexpected gains and losses that accrue to individuals independent of any possible
effort they could have exerted to bring it about, as windfalls.70 Central to the idea of a
windfall is the recognition that the actual value of an event after its occurrence (i.e., ex
post) is far in excess of its estimated value before it occurs (i.e., ex ante), such that an
individual is unlikely to have been incentivized to bring it about (or avoid it).71 Windfalls
thus represent un-incentivized gains and losses that were neither obtainable nor avoidable
respectively. In this sense then, providing creators with an entitlement beyond what they
could have been incentivized in the creative process, represents a similar windfall.
Why is this necessarily harmful? As an exclusionary mechanism over an
otherwise non-rivalrous resource, copyright (like most forms of intellectual property) is
known to impose significant social costs. It creates both static and dynamic inefficiencies,
encourages rent-seeking and entails costs associated with its enforcement by courts. 72 In
general, these costs are believed to be outweighed by the social benefits that the system
produces, in the nature of the inducement to produce creative works of expression,
rendering them tolerable.73 In relation to windfalls though, these costs aren‘t necessarily
counter-balanced by the incentive to create, since they represent, by their very nature, unincentivized gains.
In practical terms these windfalls allow creators to engage in monopolistic pricing
in new markets that couldn‘t have formed any part of their incentive in creating the work.
In addition, in relation to new uses and later-developed technologies they give creators
control over a market that they clearly aren‘t best positioned to develop. Thus, providing
creators with control over a new medium of distribution74 or a new device that uses their
creations75 (both of which are usually developed by third parties) does little more than
actively facilitate a potential holdout, raising the transaction costs for developers of new
media and devices, in the process stifling innovation there.
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See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1491 (1999) (defining windfalls as ―economic gains
independent of work, planning or other productive activities that society wishes to reward‖).
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See generally, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman & Steve Thel, Of Equal Wrongs and Half Rights, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 756 (2007) (describing windfalls in terms of the perceivable costs and benefits of
undertaking an action to bring about an event). They connect their description to tort law‘s well-known
formulation of incentives to take care (i.e., the Learned Hand formula). Id. at 756 n.66. Thus windfalls represent
situations where the costs C of bring about an event, multiplied by the probability of its occurrence P, exceed any
gains G from event, in the ex ante world. Gex ante < CP. Yet, in the ex post world (in relation to the event), these
gains increase dramatically: Gex post > CP > Gex ante.
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See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1058-59 (2005)
(elaborating on these costs); Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 194-96 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit D. Gees teds., 2000).
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See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1249 (1998).
74
See, e.g., Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 394; Fortnightly, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). See also Tim Wu, Copyright‟s
Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278 (2004).
75
See, e.g., Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 475.
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III. FORESEEABILITY AND BEHAVIORAL LIMITS TO INCENTIVES
If copyright is to be true to its theory of incentives, what it needs is a doctrinal
device that limits its grant of exclusivity by reference to the ex ante incentive that it is
meant to generate. In a host of other areas, the common law employs incentives to
produce behavioral modification among individuals and actively employs a device to
objectively shape its incentive/deterrent structure: foreseeability. Foreseeability is
commonly understood as the ―quality of being reasonably anticipatable.76‖ In the
common law however, courts use it to identify the point beyond which the possibility of
an entitlement or of liability accruing, is incapable of influencing an actor‘s ex ante
behavior, thereby rendering the occurrence unforeseeable —or, a windfall. Windfalls thus
represent un-incentivized gains and losses, and the law uses foreseeability to dislodge
them from the liability or entitlement determination. Foreseeability is thus likely to
provide copyright law with a logical basis by which to limit the entitlement by
eliminating un-incentivized windfalls associated with new uses.
A. Foreseeability and Bounded Rationality
The theory of bounded rationality is usually traced back to the work of Herbert
Simon and is premised on the recognition that human cognitive abilities are limited.77 In
innumerable contexts, Simon observed, individual decision-making tends to deviate from
the assumptions of standard rational choice theory. 78 Rational choice theory, the mainstay
of economic analysis, assumes that individual decision-makers can (i) compute the
subjective probabilities of uncertain events, (ii) assign these events monetary values, (iii)
calculate the expected utilities of alternative courses of action, and (iv) choose the one
that maximizes their expected utility.79 Bounded rationality seeks to provide an
alternative account of decision-making —one that is consistent with the actual
information-processing abilities of individuals.80
Bounded rationality thus begins with the assumption that human cognitive
abilities are by nature limited.81 There exists a finite limit to what the human mind can
process and as a consequence, decision-making is subject to this inherent imperfection.
Decisions are therefore thought to be made under conditions of limited information and
76
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limited information-processing.82 While this represents the original understanding of
bounded rationality (developed by Simon), the idea has since come to denote situations
where individuals follow a set of shortcuts referred to as ‗heuristics‘ to reach their
decisions, that often result in major deviations from the predictions of standard economic
theory.83
Bounded rationality can additionally be explained in economic terms as well.84 In
this view, individuals attempt to economize during the decision-making process. When
the costs associated with the identification of additional alternatives exceed the expected
marginal return from the identification, individuals terminate the search and choose from
one of the alternatives before them.85 They thus compromise on the optimality of the
substance of the decision to optimize their utility from the decision-making process itself.
Limited cognition of the original model is explained away by reference to the costs
associated with decision-making. Individuals are presumed capable of seeking the utilitymaximizing alternative, but choose not to out of ―rational ignorance‖. 86 As a descriptive
matter though, both explanations find common ground: human decision-making isn‘t
necessarily directed at identifying utility-maximizing alternatives.
Foreseeability is often understood as being premised on the original
understanding of bounded rationality, and as representing a limit to the predictive
capabilities of individuals. It instantiates the idea across two dimensions: one causal, and
the other temporal. Individuals are thought incapable of anticipating all the consequences
that their actions cause, and indeed consequences that extend far into the future. It thus
requires a court to evaluate future uncertain events as they would have occurred to the
individual at the time the decision to act was made and enables a classification of those
events/outcomes into those capable of being causally and temporally anticipated then
(foreseeable) and those that weren‘t (unforeseeable). The law then attributes only those
likely to be anticipated during the decision-making process into the liability or
entitlement determination. All of this occurs in recognition of the basic idea that human
cognition, as a descriptive matter, is necessarily limited.
Foreseeability thus works to eliminate from the liability/entitlement equation,
events and outcomes that weren‘t capable of forming a part of the individual‘s ex ante
decision-making process —either because the event is causally disconnected or
temporally too far out. Very importantly, it looks to whether the event was likely to be
anticipated, regardless of whether it actually was or wasn‘t —and thus focuses on
82
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cognition in an objective rather than subjective sense. Across different areas of the
common law, this basic idea informs the way in which foreseeability as a mechanism is
meant to operate.
B. Foreseeability and the Common Law
Foreseeability provides courts with a basis on which to mark the outer boundaries
of liability in different contexts, by differentiating between events that were likely to have
been anticipated by individuals and those that weren‘t. It is worth emphasizing though,
that foreseeability adds little normative content on its own. In other words, the reasons
why only events/outcomes that could have been anticipated ought to be attributed to an
actor as part of the liability or entitlement determination remain external to the idea of
foreseeability itself. They derive instead from the different policies and principles
underlying the legal regime in question.
Across different areas of the common law, foreseeability does exhibit one
important functional similarity. This relates to the common law‘s use of economic
incentives to regulate future behavior. While the common law is concerned with the
allocation of losses arising from an event, its basis for doing so is at the same time
forward-looking.87 It thus attempts to additionally induce loss-avoiding (or costminimizing) behavior, by similarly situated actors in the future.88 The possibility of
liability for harm, or indeed the absence of the same, is thought to provide rational
individuals with an incentive to modify their behavior ex ante, i.e., prior to the occurrence
of the chain of events that resulted in the harm. The same holds true for benefits as well.
The likelihood of a benefit-maximizing entitlement, it assumes, will have actors modify
their behavior in such a way as to be able to claim the entitlement.
Interestingly though, the behavioral modification that the law expects —as a
result of this incentive/deterrent effect— isn‘t infinite. Foreseeability comes into play
here. The law recognizes that given what individuals are cognitively capable of factoring
into their ex ante decision-making, events that are incapable of being anticipated and
consequently the costs and benefits associated with them, are likely to have little
influence on their decisions. It thus characterizes them as unforeseeable, in the
recognition that they form no part of individuals‘ ex ante incentives for action. This
general framework characterizes the common law‘s use of foreseeability across numerous
areas.
1. Tort Law: Negligence. — Foreseeability‘s use is perhaps most prominent in the
area of tort law, specifically in the context of liability for negligence. Foreseeability is
used to determine the existence of a ‗duty of care‘ to the plaintiff, or alternatively the
existence of ‗proximate causation‘ between the defendant‘s actions and the harm
caused.89 In both contexts, it helps courts to draw an outer limit to causal attribution.
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In the context of the ‗duty of care‘, courts ask whether the plaintiff in question
was within the scope of the duty imposed on the defendant. They then limit the duty of
care owed, to individuals and consequences foreseeable at the time that the risk was
created.90 Proximate cause on the other hand attempts to connect the defendant‘s conduct
to the plaintiff‘s injury by eliminating consequences where the attribution would be
impractical or unjust.91 Foreseeability reappears here, when courts assert that proximate
causation doesn‘t exist because the injury that occurred wasn‘t foreseeable to the
defendant.92
In both contexts, foreseeability helps courts ―sort consequences into the set of
those payable by the tortfeasor, and the set of those found too distant … to be attributed
to the tortfeasor.93‖ In the absence of this sorting, tortious liability would be unending.
Individuals would be liable for outcomes that could be attributed to them, through an
unending chain of factual events.94 Foreseeability limits this.
Through a system of liability, tort law attempts to create an ex ante incentive for
individuals to take adequate precautionary measures and exercise due care when their
actions entail risks. When the cost of liability (multiplied by the probability of its
occurrence) exceeds the cost of precaution/prevention, it is thought to generate an
incentive for due care.95 Unforeseeable consequences, disastrous as they may be, are
characterized by low probabilities of occurrence and possibly additional costs associated
with detecting, predicting and guarding against, them.96 Consequently, liability for them
is unlikely to create an incentive for greater care, because individuals will not factor them
into their risk-creating activities.97 Negligence law therefore eliminates it from its
calculus. The endogenous explanation attributes this to limitations in human cognition,
while the exogenous one would attribute it to the prohibitive costs associated with the
process of acquiring information about these events.98 Foreseeability thus ensures that the
90
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defendant is expected to have neither perfect information nor remain perfectly ignorant,
but instead be in possession of the amount of information that he is capable of and is
likely to use.99
2. Contract Law: Consequential Damages & Impossibility. — Contract law employs
foreseeability in two unrelated contexts: consequential damages and the doctrine of
impossibility of performance. Its basis for doing so remains the same.
Consequential damages are understood as damages for those losses that arise not
directly from the party‘s breach, but rather as a logical consequence of them.100 As a
matter of rule, courts limit consequential damages to those losses that can were capable
of being ―in contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of the breach of it.‖101 Consequential losses are thus recoverable only if
they were foreseeable to both parties when the contract was actually entered into.102
The idea here is that unless a party is made aware of grounds for liability beyond
direct losses, he/she is unlikely to have bargained for it and consequently the
consideration underlying the contract is unlikely to reflect the additional risk involved.
Since liability in contract law is meant to be tied to the actual bargain, the basis of the
contract, courts look to foreseeability at the time of the bargain. Again, the basis remains
the law‘s expectation of limited behavioral modification. Unless a contracting party was
likely to have foreseen a consequence, she is unlikely to have assumed the risk for it as
part of the bargain.
Additionally, contract law exempts one or both parties from performance of the
contract when a supervening event not anticipated renders performance impossible or
commercially impracticable.103 Courts here often employ the test of foreseeability to
determine (objectively) whether an event was capable of being anticipated in order to
excuse non-performance.104 The rule thus holds a party to the terms of a contract unless
the performance is rendered impossible by an ―event that was unforeseeable‖ at the time
the contract was made.105 The idea here is that it is unobjectionable to have parties incur
losses (as a result of non-performance) arising from consequences they ought to have
LAW OF TORTS 72, 91 (Gerald Postema ed., 2001). Foreseeability thus plays a major role here, based on the
notion of ―epistemic probability‖ —or the idea that individuals base their decisions not on objective assessments
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99
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seen and were therefore deemed to have been compensated for.106 Central to the idea is
thus that unforeseeable risks are incapable of having formed any part of the contractual
bargain, while foreseeable ones are deemed part of it. Again, bounded rationality and
limited behavioral modification remain motivating concerns.107 Since contracting parties
are unlikely to have foreseen all eventualities and risks when entering into the contract,
courts are reluctant to allow recovery for them.108
3. Family Law: Premarital Agreements. — Courts treat premarital agreements109
very differently from other contracts.110 When it comes to enforcing them, they routinely
examine their actual content for substantive fairness. As part of this process they often
use a foreseeability test, which asks whether the situation upon divorce seems to be one
that the parties could have anticipated when they entered into the agreement. 111 In
situations where parties‘ circumstances have changed since the agreement was entered
into, courts remain reluctant to enforce it.112
In many ways the test operates in the exact same way as the doctrine of
impossibility, except that foreseeability of the event is now a condition precedent to
enforcement, rather than non-enforcement. The driving idea is again bounded rationality
—that there exists a limit to the changes to their situations that parties are likely to have
contemplated prior to their marriage.113
4. Property Law: Coming to a Nuisance. — Premised on the principle of temporal
priority, the doctrine of ‗coming to the nuisance‘ is used to preclude nuisance actions by
plaintiffs, who move to a location where a defendant‘s activities have been going on well
before their move.114
As part of this inquiry, to determine whether a plaintiff should have been aware of
the defendant‘s prior activities when moving there, courts often use a test of
foreseeability. They thus ask if the injury being complained of was foreseeable to the
106
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See Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 119, 157 (1977) (―[T]he foreseeability requirement may only make sense if we introduce the concept of
‗bounded rationality‘‖.). See also Aaron J. Wright, Note, Rendered Impracticable: Behavioral Economics and
the Impracticability Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 2200 (2005); Shirley R. Brener, Outgrowing
Impossibility: Examining the Impossibility Doctrine in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 56 EMORY L.J. 461, 469,
477-80 (2006).
108
See id.
109
See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1(1), 9C U.L.A. 39 (2001).
110
See 2 ALEXANDER LINDEY & LOUIS I. PARLEY, LINDEY AND PARLEY ON SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 110.70(2)(d) (2d ed. 2002); Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The
Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 897 (1997).
111
See Kevin Servidea, Note, Reviewing Premarital Agreements to Protect the State‟s Interest in Marriage, 91
VA. L. REV. 535, 545 (2005).
112
See, e.g., Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 115 (W.Va. 1985) (observing how substantive review entails no more
than foreseeability); McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 267 (Minn. 1989); Button v. Button, 388
N.W.2d 546, 552 (Wis. 1986);
113
See Servidea, supra note __, at 541.
114
For more on the doctrine see Roy E. Cordato, Time Passage and the Economics of Coming to the Nuisance:
Reassessing the Coasean Perspective, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 273 (1998); Rohan Pitchford & Christopher M.
Snyder, Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective, 19 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 491 (2003); Donald Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of “Coming to the
Nuisance”, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 557 (1980).
107

Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives

22

plaintiff at the time of the move, and if answered in the affirmative, weigh it against the
plaintiff.115 Even in situations where the defendant‘s actions were temporally subsequent
to the plaintiff‘s move, courts disallow the action when the defendant‘s polluting
activities were unambiguously imminent —or, reasonably foreseeable.116 This often
comes into play in situations where the precise nuisance complained of originated after
the plaintiff‘s move, but the general category of activities (of which the defendant‘s
nuisance was but one) were known in the vicinity.117
As with other areas of law, the operating idea here is that reasonably foreseeable
consequences ought to be a part of an individual‘s motives for action. Consequently,
limiting liability for foreseeable events is meant to create an ex ante effect on individuals‘
moving decisions, by forcing them to factor them into their decisions.
5. Patent Law: Prosecution History Estoppel. — In patent law, the doctrine of
equivalents, allows courts in infringement actions, to look beyond a patent‘s exact claims,
and to enjoin as part of the patent‘s exclusivity ―unimportant and insubstantial changes‖
that do nothing more than take a defendant‘s actions outside the terms of a patent‘s literal
coverage.118 The rule of prosecution history estoppel in turn places a limit on a patentee‘s
use of the doctrine of equivalents. It applies when a patentee during the prosecution
process surrenders a claim or narrows its scope.119 The rule then bars the patentee from
later recapturing this ground via the doctrine of equivalents and operates as a rule of
abandonment.120
In determining how much a patentee surrenders each time a claim is modified
courts have recently come to use foreseeability to differentiate between abandoned and
unabandoned equivalents.121 As used now, the rule now doesn‘t preclude patentees from
using the doctrine of equivalents in relation to equivalents that were ―unforeseeable‖ to
them when they narrowed their claim, but rather only to objectively foreseeable ones.122.
The rationale being that when a patentee couldn‘t have foreseen an equivalent, he is
unlikely to have abandoned it, whereas a foreseeable equivalent, unless expressly claimed
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may be deemed consciously abandoned. Unforeseeable equivalents are thus unlikely to
have been factored into the claim-drafting process.
C. Foreseeability and Limits to Behavioral Modification
In each of the areas discussed above, foreseeability performs a similar function.
Courts attempt to reconstruct actors‘ decision-making at the time of the triggering event
—i.e., the event that triggers either the liability or the entitlement. In so doing,
foreseeability, either directly or in its manifestation through the test of ‗reasonable
foreseeability‘, allows courts to eliminate from the reconstruction certain low-probability
outcomes that couldn‘t have formed any part of the decision-making process.
As a functional matter foreseeability sets a limit to the behavioral modification
that the law expects to induce among actors. What is crucial in each of these examples
therefore is identifying the realm of intended behavioral modification that the law
(independently) aspires to achieve, and the way in which foreseeability works to temper
that.
Area of Law

Behavioral Decision

Foreseeability Limit

Rationale
Costs arising from
unforeseeable harm
aren‘t cognitively
processed.
Unforeseeable
consequences aren‘t
factored into the
contractual consideration.
Risks associated with
unforeseeable events
aren‘t contractually
allocated.
Unforeseeable events
aren‘t capable of being
anticipated by parties.
Unforeseeable nuisances
wouldn‘t have factored
into a parties‘ decision to
move/relocate.
Unforeseeable
equivalents couldn‘t have
been anticipated and
therefore abandoned.

Tort Law

Precautionary behavior
(Defendant)

Liability limited to
foreseeable consequences

Contract Law –
Consequential
Damages

Extent of consideration
bargained for
(Defendant)

Liability limited to
foreseeable losses

Contract Law –
Impossibility

Allocation of nonperformance risks
(Plaintiff/Defendant)

Exemption for nonperformance limited to
unforeseeable events.

Premarital
Agreements

Scope of agreement‘s
coverage/anticipation
(Plaintiff)
Decision to relocate to a
new locality
(Plaintiff)

Coverage limited to
foreseeable events.

Claim modification during
the prosecution process.
(Plaintiff-Patentee)

Presumptive abandonment
limited to foreseeable
equivalents.

Coming to a
Nuisance
Prosecution
History Estoppel

Liability only for
unforeseeable nuisances.

Foreseeability thus ably instantiates the idea that individuals are less than
perfectly rational, into different areas of the common law. It does so in recognition of
law‘s objective in influencing future behavior among actors and eliminating windfall
gains and losses to parties.. If copyright law is indeed about influencing creators‘ future
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behavior, by inducing them to invest time and resources into the creative process, in
exchange for exclusionary control over a market for their work, it too is concerned with
behavioral modification and should logically recognize the same limits on what creators
(as actors) are capable of factoring into their decision-making.
IV. FORESEEABILITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW
What might copyright law look like if a test of foreseeability were introduced into
its infringement inquiry, as a mechanism by which to eliminate any un-incentivized
benefits (i.e., windfalls)? This Part attempts to answer that question by proposing a new
test of ‗foreseeable copying‘ that would require a plaintiff to establish —as a
precondition to a court awarding him damages for an alleged infringement— that the
defendant‘s activities complained of (i.e., the act of infringement) were objectively
foreseeable at the time of creation, the point at which copyright‘s incentive structure is
meant to have influenced creators‘ behavior. To begin with, consider the following
hypotheticals:
Example 1: K a composer creates a musical work in the year 1955. At the time,
television and broadcast technology are well-known, as is the process of using music for
motion pictures. All the same, the video cassette recorder (VCR) hasn‘t been developed
yet. In 1985 a few years after VCRs become commercially available, S makes a copy of
K‟s work on a VHS tape when it airs on television. This use implicates K‟s exclusive
right to reproduce the work.
Example 2: C a software developer creates a short software program to diagnose
system errors. N, comes along and finding the code employed to be aesthetically pleasing,
begins using large parts of it on a line of bed-linen that he begins to market. N‘s use is
likely to implicate C‘s exclusive rights to reproduce and (perhaps) adapt the work.
Example 3: JK, an author, writes a bestselling work of fiction in the year 1995, at
which time motion picture and related technologies are well-known. In 1997, W produces
a motion picture based entirely on JK‘s novel. W‘s actions implicate JK‘s exclusive
adaptation right.
How should copyright law deal with each of these situations? Are there
significant differences that merit differential treatment? The answer to the inadequacies
of copyright‘s existing framework I argue here, lies in adopting a new correlatively
structured limiting principle of foreseeable copying, the burden for which is placed on the
plaintiff.
A. The Foreseeability Limit
If the law is willing to assume, in other areas that unforeseeable events aren‘t
motivational concerns (i.e., sufficient to be a part of the decision whether to do
something), it would seem inconsistent with its basic premise to have a system of
copyright that now assumes otherwise. Unforeseeable uses are thus unlikely to be part of
a creator‘s inducement to create in exactly the same way that unforeseeable consequences
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aren‘t a part of an individual‘s decision whether to act. A test of ‗foreseeable copying‘
would operationalize this idea.
In the abstract, foreseeability may appear to be an unworkable idea; one that is
either likely to prove indeterminate in practice or interfere significantly with creators‘
incentives. Gordon for instance, summarily rejects it as a meaningful device in copyright
law, observing that it is likely to present ―intractable proof problems‖ and ―dilute
economic incentives‖.123 She however fails to specify why this is the case and ignores
altogether the nuance with which foreseeability has come to be routinely used as an
objective indicator in a host of other areas, and more importantly the basic idea
underlying its use in different contexts: the existence of an outer limit to any expected
behavioral modification, i.e., bounded rationality.
1. „Foreseeable Copying‟. — Under the current law, protection under copyright
begins the moment a work is created, with creation being defined as the point when a
work, eligible for protection, is fixed in a tangible medium for the first time.124 Protection
however is automatic —with there being no obligation on the creator to comply with any
formalities as a prerequisite for protection. Once protected (i.e., created) the law grants
the creator a finite set of exclusive rights in relation to the work and allows the creator to
initiate an action for infringement when one of those rights is interfered with.125
When the creator (plaintiff) commences an action for infringement against a
defendant, the law places the burden on him to establish two main elements: (i)
ownership of a valid copyright, and (ii) copying by the defendant of the original (i.e.,
protected) elements.126 To establish ownership, the plaintiff usually has to establish that
the work is entitled to protection per the statutory requirements and that he is the valid
owner of the rights in it.127 However, the law requires that the work be registered with the
Copyright Office before an action for infringement is brought and this registration serves
as prima facie evidence of ownership and satisfaction of the statutory prerequisites for
protection.128 Consequently, during an infringement action courts focus on the second of
the two elements: copying.
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Since the question of copying isn‘t entirely factual, a plaintiff needs to convince a
court not just that the defendant appropriated part of his work, but also that the portion
appropriated is protectable as such.129 This is done using the substantial similarity
requirement, discussed previously. Once this is done, the requirement of foreseeability
would have courts to go one step further and require the plaintiff to show not just factual
and wrongful copying, but additionally foreseeable copying.
Foreseeability would thus operate as a third element in the determination of
copying. In addition to showing factual copying and substantial similarity, the plaintiff
would now have to satisfy a requirement of ‗foreseeable copying‘, which would ask the
question whether the defendant‟s use of the protected work (i.e., copying) was
foreseeable to the plaintiff —in form and purpose— when the work was created. It is
critical to note that the question being posed is one of foreseeability and not foresight. It
isn‘t relevant whether the plaintiff actually foresaw the defendant‘s form of copying; only
that the copying was foreseeable, in light of the information available to him at the stage
of creation. In addition, by focusing the inquiry on the point of creation (and not after), it
prevents a plaintiff from using hindsight in the inquiry.130
It is worth emphasizing that the foreseeability here relates to the ‗form and
purpose‘ of the defendant‘s copying and not to other factors, such as its magnitude or
monetary consequences. In some ways this would track tort law‘s rule on ‗eggshell skull‘
plaintiffs, where a defendant isn‘t allowed to argue that the magnitude/extent of the harm
(or loss) suffered by the plaintiff wasn‘t foreseeable because it depended on attributes
specific to the plaintiff (such as a pre-existent medical condition).131 Thus, if harm was a
foreseeable consequence of the defendant‘s actions, it matters little that the plaintiff was
an ailing old woman, rather than a teenager in perfect health. In similar manner, it should
matter little to the foreseeability determination that the defendant copied the entire book,
or made a million copies of it, rather than a few. Foreseeability, under the test, as in tort
law, would ignore magnitude.
In this formulation, foreseeability would focus on the defendant‘s actions (i.e., the
copying), rather than function as an open-ended device that courts might then connect to
the notions of ‗harm‘ or ‗market‘. Any reliance on these ideas as independent concepts,
even when prefaced by the question of foreseeability (i.e., as ―foreseeable harm‖ or
―foreseeable market‖), will inevitably depend on a set of first-order assumptions that
need to be justified on their own.132 Questions of appropriate baselines, market
substitutability, remoteness and the like enter the equation with the result that the inquiry
begins to focus less on the creator‘s ex ante incentive at the time of creation and more on
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these other elements.133 ‗Foreseeable copying‘ on the other hand obviates any reliance on
first-order assumptions and connects foreseeability as a behavioral device with the
defendant‘s action that is always at the core of an infringement dispute, copying.
Given that copying in one form or another is central to every action for
infringement, the test of foreseeability would operate regardless of which exclusive right
the plaintiff alleges the defendant to have interfered with. Thus in most situations where
substantial similarity is easily satisfied, the foreseeability test would be too. But in
situations where the defendant‘s copying is a consequence of an innovative use that
doesn‘t owe its existence to the creator, it begins to play a significant role. Thus, uses of
prior works such as the Google Library Project that employ prior works in a new way are
likely to satisfy the substantial similarity test; but whether they constitute copying would
now depend on the plaintiffs establishing that the use was within the realm of foreseeable
uses when the work was created.134 The same would be the case for uses involving new
media such as cable television, home recording or the digitization of music.
As previously noted, under the current doctrine, questions of this nature are
relegated to the fair use inquiry. Given its position as an affirmative defense, the burden
then falls to the defendant to show how his actions (of copying) weren‘t harmful to the
plaintiff.135 It places the entire focus on the defendant, glossing over the uses that the
plaintiff might have legitimately expected to control in creating the work. A test of
foreseeability (or foreseeable copying) shifts the burden onto the plaintiff to establish this
as part of the infringement inquiry now and thereby connect his work to the defendant‘s
use more directly.
2. Mirroring Non-obviousness. — The foreseeable copying test requires a court to
go back in time to the year in which the work was created (and copyright attached to it) in
order to determine whether the defendant‘s present use was capable of being anticipated
then. In many ways, its retrospective nature mirrors patent law‘s requirement of nonobviousness. The law requires courts to invalidate a patent if the subject matter of the
invention would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art (i.e., the
PHOSITA) ―at the time the invention was made‖.136 To determine whether an invention
was non-obvious, courts are thus required to put themselves not just in the shoes of a
potential inventor, but base their finding on his/her likely awareness at the time of the
invention.137 In constructing the entitlement (i.e., the patent), courts thus go back in time
to assess what might have been known to the inventor when the invention was made and
thereupon validate the invention only if it wasn‘t obvious then.
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Foreseeable copying would now have courts do just the opposite. It asks courts to
determine whether the defendant‘s (present) use was ‗obvious‘ to the creator (the
plaintiff) at the time of the creation. It might thus adopt an equivalent of the PHOSITA
standard, calibrated to the world of creators; one where a creator is presumed at
minimum, to be informed —in the sense that he/she knows of the different mediums in
existence, in which the work can be employed; and rational —intends to either directly
or indirectly control the markets for those different mediums.
*****
Going back then to our earlier examples, involving K, C and JK.
In 1990, assume that K were to commence an action for copyright infringement
against P, a producer who uses the work in a television broadcast without a license and S,
who makes copies of it using a VCR. Under the proposed requirement of foreseeability,
the onus would be on K to establish that both P‘s and S‘s use of the work constitute forms
of ‗foreseeable copying‘ —that were foreseeable in 1955, i.e., when K created the work.
K would have little problem doing this in relation to P‘s actions, given that television
broadcasts were well-known in 1955, but vis-à-vis S his case would be more difficult,
since VCRs were neither known nor invented in 1955.138 A court is thus likely to
concluded that since video recording is ―markedly different‖ from mere television
viewing, the use of the work therein wasn't foreseeable and S‘s use isn‘t foreseeable
copying.139
In identical vein, the burden would be on C to establish that N‘s use of his literary
work as part of a new line of bed-linen was foreseeable (even if as a derivative work) at
the time of creation. While the inquiry doesn‘t assume the question to be answered one
way or the other, a court is more likely than not to find against C. However, in JK‘s case,
the outcome is likely to be different. There, since motion picture technology and the use
of literary works as storylines therein were well-established practices when JK created
the work, a court is likely to conclude that W‘s use was indeed foreseeable, amounting to
an act of infringement.
JK‘s case serves to highlight an important point. Merely because a defendant‘s
use is different from the creator‘s doesn‘t mean that it automatically comes to be
exempted from liability. Not all new uses are unforeseeable. Where new uses are indeed
foreseeable, as in the case of traditional derivatives, the foreseeability test is likely to
come out in favor of the plaintiff, with few problems. The reason for this is simple: the
possibility of a movie adaptation might have formed some part of JK‘s incentive in
creating the work.
While on the face of things then, a test of foreseeable copying appears to be a
perfectly reasonable idea when viewed in the context of copyright doctrine, its
acceptability will however depend on two additional factors: (i) being compatible with
138
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copyright‘s role as an inducement for creativity, and (ii) offering courts a workable basis
on which to construe the copyright grant. These are each considered in turn.
B. Compatibility: Foreseeability and Copyright‟s Incentive Structure
A test of foreseeability is likely to limit a creator‘s control over the uses to which
his or her creation may be put. In specific, it would eliminate those objectively
unforeseeable at the time of creation, from the scope of the entitlement. What effect, if
any, is this likely to have on creators‘ ex ante incentives to create? Is knowing that they
are unlikely to be able to control unanticipated uses of their work likely to affect their
inducement to create the work to begin with? Alternatively, will it impact their incentive
to distribute the work?
This Section argues that a foreseeability-based limit is perfectly compatible with
copyright‘s basic structure as an incentive.
1. Open-ended Expectations. — Given the development of technological media over
the last several decades and the incremental extension of copyright terms by Congress
that has followed, one might argue that creators today rightfully expect such
developments to occur, and are indeed driven (i.e., incentivized) by the expectation. 140 If
they tend to factor these expectations into their ex ante creative decision-making,
shouldn‘t copyright vindicate them ex post?
To begin with, it is worth noting that these open-ended expectations differ from
the paradigmatic incentive. Unlike incentives that are grounded in ascertainable market
indicators, expectations rely almost entirely on predictions that derive from events in the
past that have no independent reason to repeat themselves in the future. Thus, a creator‘s
expectation in creating a work today, hoping that at some time in the future Congress is
likely to retroactively extend the copyright term simply because it has done so before is
markedly different from her incentive in creating the work, attempting to satisfy an
identifiable demand for works of that nature and generating profits from the process.
Similarly, a creator‘s belief that her work will come to be used in association with some
wholly unforeseeable medium, merely because such unforeseeable media emerged in the
past, represents an expectation that isn‘t necessarily grounded in anything other than a
bald prediction that a historical contingency is likely to repeat itself.141 It isn‘t readily
apparent that copyright needs to validate every ex ante estimate/expectation of a creator.
One might indeed want such expectations to form some part of copyright‘s
incentive structure —in the same way as a lottery with fluctuating odds does in the end
provide individuals with an incentive. Indeed current policy tends to favor its inclusion.
As Sara Stadler notes, courts and legislators are often driven by creators‘ ‗expectations‘
(determined ex post) in constructing copyright‘s actual incentive, creating a cycle that
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results in the outward expansion of copyright‘s exclusive rights regime. 142 The process of
determining the incentive is then indirectly delegated to creators —who equate their
open-ended expectations with their incentives— resulting in anything short of perfect
control being viewed as less than optimal.143 A large part of this of course derives from
the obvious use of hindsight to reconstruct the ex ante incentive. Having brought the
work into existence, creators argue that they wouldn‘t have done so had they known that
their open-ended expectations would not be realized, causing courts and policy-makers to
impute this ex post realization into their ex ante decision-making.
Leaving aside the question of whether this expectation should at all be a part of
copyright‘s incentive structure if indeed we remain concerned with a satisfactory (as
opposed to optimal, or maximal) incentive, the question that persists is whether the test of
‗foreseeable copying‘ is likely to directly interfere with or diminish, that expectation.
Here, the fact that the test is structured as an uncertain standard rather than as a brightline rule is likely to make a major difference.144
Unlike rules, standards are characterized by their relegating the process of giving
content to the law and its application, to a point in time after an action has taken place,
i.e., ex post.145 Rules are generally more costly to create upfront (given the precision they
involve), while standards transfer those costs to the adjudicative process.146 Viewed ex
ante then, standards thus tend to be somewhat indeterminate (or fuzzy), characterized by
the uncertainty of their applicability to a specific context. This uncertainty it turns out
though, is responsible for minimizing the law‘s impact on creative decision-making.
Intellectual property laws —patent and copyright in specific— contain
innumerable vague standards.147 In many ways this is largely beneficial. Standards enable
courts to calibrate the scope of the entitlement to its underlying purpose and function.148
This is especially true when it comes to standards that work to limit an entitlement.
Incentives tend to vary from one inventor/creator to another or one area of application to
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another, necessitating significant contextual fine-tuning.149 In these contexts, a bright-line
rule would have the effect of proving insufficient for creators/inventors who need ex ante
incentives in excess of the curtailed entitlement, since the curtailment would be known
upfront. While a standard wouldn‘t necessarily limit the entitlement any less than an
equivalent rule, it would only ever curtail the entitlement ex post, thereby providing the
creator/inventor with the necessary (but probabilistic) incentive upfront. One might thus
call this the perverse effect of uncertainty on incentives. Because a creator/inventor
doesn‘t know ex ante that the entitlement is likely to exclude certain things, the impact
that the standard has on his incentive is minimal.
Indeed this has for long been recognized to be true in the patent law context.
Patent law, much like copyright, is concerned with providing inventors with an incentive
in the nature of an exclusionary right. Since the process of innovation that patent law is
concerned with tends to entail greater investment of time and effort, the incentive that it
needs to provide innovators with has to be much stronger —manifested in the scope and
coverage of its exclusionary rights framework.150 Anything weaker than these broad
incentives, is unlikely to result in the necessary investment of resources into the process
of innovation. Notwithstanding the need for these strong incentives, scholars have argued
that standards-based ex post limits on patent law‘s grant of exclusionary right are likely to
have little impact on the original incentive. This analysis is particularly instructive here.
Patent rights are inherently probabilistic by nature. Their existence, validity, and
scope are contingent on a host of considerations, most of which are outside the owner‘s
(i.e., creator‘s) control.151 Uncertainty thus manifests itself in more ways than one, all the
way until the right is adjudicated upon. Consequently, contingent ex post limits have little
impact on the original incentive, given the extent of uncertainty there exists to begin with.
In a counter-intuitive move, Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer thus argue that increasing
patent law‘s overall uncertainty through under-inclusive standards (as opposed to overinclusive rules), so as to reduce the system‘s predictability is likely to curb monopolistic
pricing without impacting a patentee‟s original incentive.152 They thus advocate the use
of standard-based doctrines such as the ‗reverse doctrine of equivalents‘—which allows a
defendant to avoid liability ex post by showing that his actions weren‘t within the
‗principle‘ of the claimed invention, even though they fall within its scope when literally
construed.153 Such doctrines, they argue, have little effect on a patentee‘s original
incentive to invest resources into the innovation process, even though possibility of its
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being used later on (to diminish the entitlement) is known up-front.154 Since its
invocation and use depend on events, the occurrence of which are inherently
unpredictable (i.e., unforeseeable), they have little impact on a patentee‘s ex ante
incentives.
To be sure, Ayres and Klemperer recognize that this increase in the uncertainty of
enforcement needs to be compensated for, in order to avoid interfering significantly with
an innovator‘s incentive.155 Consequently, they advocate extending a patent‘s duration
(again ex post) to off-set any increased uncertainty, based on a system of Ramsey
pricing.156 They propose implementing this by allowing patentee‘s to leverage their
power into the future, or alternatively expanding the geographic/product scope of the
patent.157 In the copyright context, the Ramsey intuition side of their model could be
implemented in more than one context. First, if enhancing copyright‘s term of protection
is indeed a possible off-set, one might argue that this is in some ways already in place,
given the periodicity with which Congress extends terms retroactively without a valid
empirical basis for the extension. Using the Ayres-Klemperer framework then, current
copyright policy already reflects elements of staggered-duration Ramsey pricing, making
the introduction of additional uncertainty via a foreseeability test, the equivalent of their
―stationarity intuition‖.158 In the alternative however, another option would certainly lie
in minimizing reliance on the currently incomprehensible fair use doctrine; something the
foreseeability test is likely to achieve on its own, by moving most of these (i.e., fair-use
related) issues to the entitlement delineation process.
In more simple terms, Robert Merges argues that the reverse doctrine of
equivalents, as an ex post limit, is likely to have no more than a minimal effect on the
original incentive, given the numerous other contingencies that the patentee is faced with
even before that stage is reached.159 The inherently probabilistic nature of the rightsbundle thus generates sufficient uncertainty on its own, such that the uncertainty that the
vague standard adds to it, is marginal.
Others such as Michael Meurer and Craig Nard even go one step further. They
argue that limiting patent law‘s doctrine of equivalents —which allows a patentee to
control uses of the invention that weren‘t foreseeable and therefore not literally covered
by the patent‘s claims— is likely to have little to no impact on the original incentive.160
As long as the entitlement allows the inventor to cover his/her appreciation of ―industry
and technology trends‖, they argue that curtailing the entitlement ex post, by eliminating
unforeseeable developments from its coverage is unlikely to have an appreciable impact
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on incentives.161 They thus observe that the incentive isn‘t harmed when ―when, ex post,
she is denied [protection] over technology that she did not foresee ex ante.162‖
When carving unforeseeable uses out of the entitlement ex post isn‘t thought to be
problematic in the context of patents, where the incentive is much closer to the ideal of
‗perfect control‘, it is indeed more than plausible that a similar limit is likely to be even
less problematic in the copyright context. First off, copyright‘s entitlement structure is
certainly more contingent/probabilistic than is its equivalent in patent law. The absence
of an administrative agency validating the grant at first instance, coupled with its
emphasis on a showing of actual and actionable copying, make its grant more uncertain.
Secondly, our focus here is on the impact that a foreseeability limit is likely to have on
unpredictable expectations. To the extent that these expectations aren‘t based on industry
and technology trends but rather on stochastic occurrences whose probabilities aren‘t
ascertainable, they only ever enter the equation with a very high initial level of
uncertainty. Consequently, any additional uncertainty that the test as an ex post standard,
will introduce and thereby impact the overall incentive structure, is likely to be
insignificant.
Additionally, ex post, indeterminate constraints on exclusivity are rather wellknown in copyright law, in the form of the fair use doctrine.163 Structured as a standard, it
too renders the exclusivity contingent on factors that are often outside a creator‘s control,
and in many ways unpredictable.164 In circumstances where a court concludes that the
defendant‘s use is sufficiently transformative, or substantially non-infringing, it
effectively circumscribes the grant, ex post. Few argue that fair use needs to be
eliminated because its contextual ex post uncertainty interferes with creator incentives.165
The uncertainty of the standard, if anything, is likely to deter potential users (i.e., putative
infringers) from treading too close to the boundaries of impermissible copying.166
Indirectly therefore, this is likely to preserve creators‘ original incentives by deterring
significant infringement.
What is more likely to interfere with creators‘ original incentives is a bright-line
rule that limits copyright‘s grant ex ante. Proposals aimed at limiting a copyright holder‘s
bundle of rights ex ante contextually thus suffer from this drawback. Consequently, a
bright-line ex post standard is preferable to a vague or bright-line rule that would limit the
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grant ex ante and thereby interfere with a creator‘s incentives, as others have noted in the
patent context.167
If copyright‘s incentive structure thus entails avoiding any harm to creators‘
expectations, regardless of their bases, the foreseeability test being structured as a fuzzystandard will ensure that any impact it is likely to have on these expectations is at best,
marginal.
2. Prospect Theory. — A second argument derives from a variant of incentive
theory that finds application in the world of patents, and is commonly referred to as the
‗prospect theory‘.168 According to this theory, the exclusive rights regime operates much
like a mineral prospecting system with the creator being given an incentive to invest
further in the creation and improve upon it, without fear that free-riders will appropriate
the benefits of it.169 While the theory originated in the context of patents, it is often
employed as a justificatory device in copyright law.170
The prospect argument assumes that giving creators greater control ex ante,
incentivizes their own actual development of new uses ex post.171 It thus ties in with what
some describe as copyright‘s distributional incentive —the idea that copyright exists to
give creators an incentive to both create and distribute their work publicly. Control over
unforeseeable uses then, it might be argued, gives them an incentive to develop aftermarkets that weren‘t obvious to them at the time of creation. One might thus characterize
the argument as one relating to an ex post incentive.172
First off, it isn‘t readily apparent why a creator is best placed to control and direct
future development of the creation.173 Historically, some of the most beneficial new uses
167
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for works and ideas have almost never come from creators and inventors of the
originals.174 Most new uses entail the development of new technologies of distribution
and thus involve inventive processes unconnected with those of a creator (artistic,
literary, etc.). Consequently, barring entities that engage in both creativity and research
into new mechanisms of distribution —unquestionably, a small minority— the two are
unlikely to go together. The process of creation in copyright law is additionally far less
resource intensive than is the process of developing new mechanisms (i.e., technologies)
of distribution. As a result, there seems little reason to believe that the creator of an
expressive work is best placed to invest in the management of, or in developing new uses
for that work, when that investment is likely to be orthogonal to, and far in excess of, the
one made for the original creation. Thus for instance, it isn‘t clear why the Beatles (or
any music group) might have been expected to invest in the development of digital
recording, just because they created the expressive work, the subject of the recording.
Unlike in patent law then, there remains little basis to believe that the original creator is
best suited to developing new uses, a fact that is borne out vividly in copyright cases
involving new uses.175
In response, it might be argued however that even if creators themselves aren‘t
best-placed to invest in further development, they might license this out to others;
copyright‘s grant of exclusivity then becomes necessary to incentivize these others to
invest in the development process. In this formulation, exclusivity in the post-creation
market functions as a distributional incentive, not for creators, but rather for independent
distributors (e.g. record companies).
Now even if distributors do need an incentive to invest in developing the market
for new distribution mechanisms it seems to make little sense to vest it in the creator, on
the assumption that the rights will come to be allocated most efficiently. In a world of
zero transaction costs, this would indeed make no difference; but where these costs are
significant and remain coupled with the problem of potential holdouts (e.g., a creator
refusing to license the work to a distributor for whimsical reasons), the argument seems
fairly problematic. If distributional incentives are indeed necessary, a more plausible
basis for it might lie in creating an independent entitlement and vesting it in the
distributor directly.176
One of the main concerns motivating the prospect theory, in the patent context, is
the idea that if an inventor isn‘t allowed to control future uses and development of the
invention early on, this is likely to result in wasteful duplicative efforts among inventors.
An improver might decide to take the inventor‘s nascent idea, develop and commercialize
it, regardless of the inventor doing the exact same thing (perhaps in the belief that he is
likely to be the first to do so). This, the prospect theory argues, results in a redundancy, or
174
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deadweight loss, that is clearly of no benefit socially.177 Multiple inventors might expend
resources not just to get the initial patent monopoly, but also later on, to improve and
commercially develop the invention. Since such efforts are likely to be wasteful, the
prospect theory argues for a forward-looking patent regime that extends a patentee‘s
grant beyond the immediate idea, to unforeseeable uses of it as well.178
This concern with redundancy sits somewhat oddly within the broader scheme of
copyright policy, which otherwise actively encourages such redundancies. Copyright‘s
defense of independent creation has long been identified as one of its defining features,
and one that sets it apart from patent.179 Perhaps more importantly, copyright law has
long avoided according protection to ideas, with the result that expressive variations that
rely on a single idea are tolerated, even when actively copied. 180 If the law recognizes,
and tolerates multiple versions in these different contexts, it seems unlikely to find the
development of a use which the creator couldn‘t himself identify, as being problematic or
redundant, in the sense that patent law might. In addition, the law actively tolerates (and
encourages) duplicative expressions of the same idea. Indeed, when the possibility of
such redundancy isn‘t deemed sufficient to interfere with copyright‘s original incentive
(i.e., to create), its interference with ex post incentives through a loosening of control
over unforeseeable uses is likely to be negligible, if not non-existent.
In many ways then, the prospect theory operates on assumptions that seem alien
to copyright‘s general structure and perhaps more importantly, to the peculiarities of
unforeseeable uses in the context of expressive works.
*****
A requirement of foreseeability then —whereby a creator is denied control over
unforeseeable uses of the work— is unlikely to interfere significantly with his original
incentive to create the work. The impact, if any, it is likely to have is marginal. To the
contrary, one might argue, the rule is likely to generate a new kind of incentive among
creators.
The foreseeability test is in the end an objective one, dependent on the general
state of knowledge known at the time of creation, which is then imputed to the creator.
Consequently, in situations where the creator is best-positioned to generate this level of
knowledge, it incentivizes the creator to actually make it widely known. Take the case of
a company that invests in the development of both software and hardware technologies.
Assume that the company were to develop a new software program (that meets the
requirements for copyright protection) —and foresees the possibility of the program
finding application in a new platform (in addition to those in existence) that it is in the
process of developing. Instead of being able to keep the new platform (or the technology
177
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that it is likely to employ there) completely secret, the requirement now forces it to
generate an objective level of knowledge about the platform. This could range from
simple trade journal publications or other research disclosures —where it describes the
basis of the new platform‘s use of the copyrighted work (i.e., the software). Disclosures
of this kind are likely to be of immense benefit socially —and the principle of
foreseeability now creates an active incentive for it. By making the scope of liability
depend on the plaintiff‘s disclosure of possible uses —in situations where the plaintiff is
indeed in the best position to foresee new uses— the requirement creates an ex ante
incentive to disseminate information relating to possible uses widely.
Foreseeability as an information-generating incentive performs a function that
mirrors its role in tort law. In the absence of a foreseeability limit, tort law would have
individuals devoting needless time and energy into assessing the probabilities of remote
events, in order to avoid liability.181 In the copyright context, by contrast we have a
potential entitlement (as opposed to liability) and perhaps more importantly, a basic
recognition that the additional information generated (or is likely to be generated) is
socially beneficial, rather than wasteful. In this latter respect, it resembles the rule in
Hadley.182 A creator‘s acquisition of knowledge that his work could be used in relation to
a new platform technology that is in the process of being developed is clearly different
from a potential tortfeasor spending resources to know that his actions could trigger an
infinite variety of harms/injuries among individuals in the vicinity of his actions. The
foreseeability rule would in the context of copyright serve to generate an incentive to
generate the former, while it operates to deter the latter —likely producing an overall
social benefit.
C. Workability: Objective Constructions of the Copyright Grant
Even if the test of ‗foreseeable copying‘ is compatible with copyright‘s theory of
incentives, does it actually present courts with a workable basis on which to construe
copyright‘s grant of exclusivity? In other words, isn‘t it likely to complicate copyright
law by introducing an altogether new conceptual device, the use of which would entail
additional costs?
Interestingly enough, the idea of foreseeability isn‘t altogether alien to copyright
law and its treatment of new uses. It remains somewhat common for courts to use the
idea in construing the scope of rights granted by a licensor to the licensee under a license
for the work.183 Its use in that context is likely to provide courts with a directly relevant
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way in which to operationalize the test, making the transition to the new approach much
simpler than one might imagine.
Foreseeability in the licensing context, traces itself back to Judge Friendly, who in
the case of Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,184 is credited with using it to
determine whether an assignment of motion picture rights included the right to telecast a
copyrighted work. Observing that knowledgeable people knew of television‘s potential at
the time that the license was entered into, the court there concluded that the licensor had
―reason to know‖ of the new technology and was therefore deemed to have included it in
the grant.185 In Bartsch, the district court had in turn relied on expert testimony to the
effect that ―[t]he processes of theatre and home television exhibition [were] markedly
similar‖ from both commercial and technical perspectives in the industry, when the
contract was entered into —thirty-seven years prior to the actual litigation.186 The Second
Circuit endorsed this approach to construing the license, concluding that the work‘s use
in the context of a telecast was therefore plainly foreseeable.187
As a seemingly natural corollary, in situations where the technology or use in
question wasn‘t publicly known at the time that the license was entered into, or where
circumstances mean that there exists no reasonable basis on which to impute knowledge
of the same to the licensor (at the time of the licensing), courts construe the grant
narrowly to exclude the new use (in dispute) from its scope.188
The logic for this attempt to limit the grant resonates with foreseeability‘s use as a
bounded rationality-driven device. Thus, one court openly alluded to this in noting that a
new use needed to be excluded from the contractual grant when it ―was completely
unforeseeable and therefore could not possibly have formed part of the bargain between
the parties at the time of the original grant.189‖ Since contract law is concerned with
linking liability (for breach) with parties‘ intent in entering into the contract, factors and
possibilities that couldn‘t have possibly formed part of this intent are excluded, and
liability correspondingly limited. As a matter of contract law, this approach may appear
reasonable and perfectly logical, given contract law‘s focus on the parties‘ ‗bargain‘.190
All the same, the approach is often justified in non-contractual terms as well: as
deriving from the need to avoid giving one party an unjustified windfall. In explaining
the rationale for it, one court for instance, notes that the foreseeability test prevents the
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licensee from reaping ―the entire windfall‖ associated with the unforeseen use.191
Allowing a licensee to benefit from exogenous technological developments that weren‘t
part of the bargain is deemed a ‗windfall‘ and perhaps rightly so. But why then isn‘t the
licensor‘s (i.e., creator‘s) benefiting from similar exogenous developments a ‗windfall‘
too? In other words, why shouldn‘t the unforeseeable windfall remain outside the reach
of the original copyright grant to begin with?
Foreseeability is thus used to limit a licensee‘s copyright grant, but not the
licensor‘s original one, which remains somewhat of an anomaly— especially given that
courts have over the years developed tools by which to answer the retrospective inquiry
in the contractual context. They look to popular media, trade journals, expert testimony,
industry practice, and at times, simple logic to assess the foreseeability of a specific use.
Each of these tools/mechanisms is capable of direct use in construing copyright‘s original
grant of exclusivity as well.
Cases such as White-Smith are more than apt for an analogous application of the
foreseeability test.192 In White-Smith, the Supreme Court was presented with the question
of whether a composer‘s exclusive rights in a musical composition extended to its use in
the market for perforated rolls used in mechanical piano players to produce the same
sounds.193 Attempting to objectively determine the boundaries of the statutory grant by
reference to legislative intent, the Court found for the defendants.194 In their arguments
before the Court however, both parties made express reference to the foreseeability of the
defendant‘s actions. The plaintiff plainly conceded that when the works in question were
composed —in 1831— the use of perforated rolls was ―not known‖ (and therefore
unforeseeable), yet maintained that this fact was immaterial to the question of liability. 195
In spite of this, the Court preferred to exempt the defendant by reference to Congress‘
failure to specify certain new technologies in its definition of ‗copying‘.196
A direct consequence of the Court‘s objective approach (of deferring to
Congressional intent in construing copyright‘s exclusivity), was of course that when
Congress chose to amend the copyright statute to make it technologically-neutral, the
Court‘s reasoning was rendered redundant. Instead, had the Court taken the plaintiff‘s
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admission seriously, and chosen to examine whether the defendant‘s use was in any sense
foreseeable (in light of the existent technology at the time), using the methods developed
to construe copyright licenses, it might have reached the same conclusion —but on much
firmer footing.
In addition, the bipolarity of copyright disputes is likely to ensure that in the
infringement context, parties will advance opposing constructions of foreseeability in
much the same way as they do in the contractual setting. Thus in the contractual setting,
there are three parties in the overall scheme of things: (i) the original grantor of rights
(OG), the state, (ii) the original grantee (OGe), also the contractual grantor (CG or the
licensor), and (iii) the contractual grantee (CGe), the licensee.
State
(OG)

Original Grant

Author/Licensor
(OGe/CG)

Contractual Grant

Licensee
(CGe)

When a court is called upon to interpret the scope of an assignment, the dispute is
now between the author in his capacity as contractual grantor (CG) and the licensee, as
contractual grantee (CGe). Courts use foreseeability as an objective proxy for parties‘
intentions, to determine whether or not the disputed use was part of the assignment. What
is critical however is that both parties to the dispute have opposing interests in
interpreting the grant. The grantor naturally prefers a narrow construction (to limit the
assignment), while the grantee, a broader and more expansive one.
In an infringement action by contrast, the author as original grantee (OGe) now
prefers an expansive construction of the grant, while the original grantor (OG), the state,
isn‘t a party to the proceeding. Instead of the state however, is the defendant, whose
interests interestingly enough, track those of the contractual grantor (CG) in the bilateral
setting. The defendant‘s interest is thus to narrow the grant, and thereby minimize/avoid
liability for infringement. The absence of a grantor seeking a narrow construction of the
grant is accounted for by the presence of the defendant. Given the bipolar setting within
which the entitlement and its scope is determined, it replicates the exact same process and
interests that are at play in the contractual one.
It is worth emphasizing that even though it may appear as if the foreseeability
inquiry is one of subjective intent—i.e., whether one or both parties actually foresaw the
grant as covering a use—in reality, the determination is always objective.197 Since
parties‘ intentions are readily apparent from the terms of the contract, courts impute
foresight (or the lack thereof) to parties based on external circumstantial evidence. The
test is thus entirely objective and has little to do with parties‘ actual intentions.
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Consequently, the mere fact that unlike in the contract setting, one of the parties (the
state, OG) isn‘t present and able to advance a construction of its actual intent, is
completely irrelevant. The bipolar nature of the dispute before the court ensures that this
happens in both contexts, even when either grantor or grantee isn‘t a party to the
proceedings before the court.198
Foreseeability as a limiting basis then, is perfectly well-known in the world of
copyright. Expanding it beyond its current use in the bilateral context, to construing
copyright‘s original grant of exclusivity as well, is likely to face few conceptual hurdles.
V. OBJECTIONS
Having examined how a test of foreseeability might work in the copyright
context, its likely impact on creator incentives, and the manner in which courts might
implement it, this Part looks to three potential objections that may be raised to it. They
are in turn that: (a) a foreseeability limit renders copyright‘s extended term of protection
meaningless, (ii) as a standard it is indeterminate and incoherent, and (iii) it is likely to
rely heavily on hindsight.
A. Term Redundancy
Since 1950, Congress has extended copyright‘s term of protection twelve times
and today works are protected for a period of 95 years from the year of creation. 199 On
the face of it, one might argue, a test of foreseeability will by necessity come to limit this
duration. No creator can expect to foresee uses to which the work may be put, nine
decades into the future; consequently, copyright‘s long term of protection becomes
somewhat redundant. The existence of an extended period of protection, might be taken
as evidence of an intent to protect unforeseeable uses as well.
Yet, it is precisely the existence of this abnormally long period of protection that
justifies non-temporal limits on copyright. In the world of intellectual property, the
existence of trade-offs between term and extent remain somewhat well-known. Thus,
while patent law gives inventors a set of exclusive rights for no more than 20 years
(unlike copyright‘s 95), the extent and coverage of those rights are far wider than those of
copyright.200 Unlike copyright, patent rights aren‘t limited by numerous subject-matter
198
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limits and purpose-based exceptions, which is taken to justify the correspondingly short
term of protection.201 Copyright‘s extended term is therefore a policy reason to relax
rather than strengthen its coverage non-temporally.
The frequency with which Congress has extended copyright‘s term, yet left intact
its basic entitlement structure —without seeking to take it in the direction of patent law—
is perhaps additionally indicative of its acceptance of (or acquiescence in) judiciallycreated, non-term related, limiting devices.
B. Potential Indeterminacy
A second and perhaps, more basic objection to the model proposed derives from
the flexibility inherent in the idea of foreseeability. This objection might proceed as
follows. Ascertaining whether a defendant‘s copying is foreseeable or not is dependent
on the specificity with which the form/mechanism of copying is described. Consequently,
the same action might be classified as foreseeable/unforeseeable depending on a judge‘s
description of it —rendering its application grossly inconsistent.
An argument along these lines is somewhat well-known in relation to
foreseeability‘s use in tort law.202 Referred to as the ―multiple description‖ problem, it
postulates that speaking of foreseeability is meaningless in the absence of individuals
having a system of shared meaning that they adhere to in their description of an event. 203
Given the fact that the foreseeability of an event (or use) is only ever reconstructed ex
post, when additional details are known, judges and juries are likely to come to different
conclusions on the same set of facts, depending entirely on their descriptions of the event.
To the extent that foreseeability depends on an individual‘s description of an
event, it certainly is subject to some amount of indeterminacy. Yet the fact of the matter
remains, that at some basic level individuals do share a common set of conceptual
meanings in understanding the way the world works.204 Most of tort law, and indeed the
common law, takes this for granted, and it would seem somewhat inconsistent to argue
that foreseeability will fall prey to a level of indeterminacy any greater than that fostered
by current common law devices. In the context of tort law, Hart and Honoré thus argue:
[T]o avoid fallacies, the first question to ask is not ―Was this harm foreseeable?‖ but
―Under what specific description which fits this harm has experience taught us to
anticipate harm?‖. If we have learned from experience to expect a ―rainstorm‖ on seeing
dark clouds, then the rainstorm was foreseeable even if, when it occurs, it has other
characteristics.205

Foreseeability thus places reliance on the existence of a common meaning system
among individuals similarly situated; one that derives from shared experience.
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Descriptive variations thus do not correspond to the reality that individuals tend to view
the world (and respond to stimuli in it) in similar ways. In studying human perception,
noted linguistic philosopher, J.L. Austin thus observed that individuals tend to ―perceive‖
the world and understand themselves to be doing so in roughly similar ways —in terms
of what he called ―moderate sized specimens of dry goods‖ or ―familiar objects‖. 206 The
existence of a basic meaning structure is thus central to much of the law‘s basic
conceptual framework and to the extent that it might be characterized as indeterminate, so
too is foreseeability.
The idea of a shared system of meaning is in many ways central to current
copyright doctrine. In the context of substantial similarity for instance, courts have long
recognized that dissimilarities, while relevant to the inquiry, are to be differentiated into
trivial and non-trivial ones, the former being understood as those that involve
modifications to non-central parts of the work.207 Whether something is a trivial
modification or not is inevitably a qualitative assessment, based on what a court perceives
to be central to the protected work. The test of foreseeable copying would now ask courts
to do no more than extend that logic beyond just the work, to its broader context or
medium of use.
C. Hindsight Bias
A third possible objection derives from a more nuanced understanding of
individual decision-making and the cognitive biases that occur therein. Hindsight bias
refers to the general tendency among individuals to see an event that has actually
occurred as more probable than it actually was before its occurrence. 208 The presence of
information about an outcome thus produces an unjustified increase in its perceived
predictability.209 Given copyright law‘s ex post process of entitlement delineation, any
attempt to reconstruct a creator‘s foresight at the time of creation will therefore inevitably
be influenced by information possessed by the decision-maker that wasn‘t available to the
creator ex ante. Judges will therefore be more inclined to view a defendant‘s copying as
foreseeable to the plaintiff at the time of creation, when presented with actual evidence of
the copying.
In the related context of patent law, while determining the validity of a patent,
courts are required to determine whether the patentee‘s idea was non-obvious (to a skilled
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person) at the time of its invention.210 It thus entails a similar retrospective reconstruction
of an actor‘s likely foresight. In that context, studies have shown that hindsight tends to
play a major role.211 Given the structural similarity between the non-obviousness inquiry
and the proposed foreseeability test in copyright law, the same consequence is likely to
been seen in the latter too.
Studies have indeed shown that both judges and jurors overwhelmingly tend to let
negative outcomes influence their eventual decisions, when asked to examine the ex ante
foreseeability of an event after its actual occurrence. 212 As a structural matter copyright
however, lends itself almost perfectly to the possibility of hindsight bias. Since the
existence and scope of the entitlement in a work are only ever decided when the
defendant copies parts of it, the presence of actual copying (appropriation) tends to hurt
the defendant‘s case. Indeed, as a historical matter courts seem to have acknowledged
their reliance on hindsight with observations like ―what is worth copying, is worth
protecting‖.213 A similar situation, one might argue, is likely to occur in relation to the
test of foreseeable copying as well. While courts are asked to determine whether a
particular form of copying was foreseeable in the past, they do so with it actually before
them. To the extent that copyright law remains structurally different from both patent and
trademark law, in its ex post entitlement delineation, the test of foreseeability too is likely
to exhibit the same deficiencies of the existent system. There may be reason however to
believe that the introduction of a foreseeability limit is likely to minimize the overall
effect of any hindsight on the determination.
What contributes towards the hindsight bias during an infringement inquiry is the
fact that courts are presented with evidence of actual copying (the extent itself varying)
by the defendant, at the same time or before they determine the existence of the plaintiff‘s
entitlement. As a consequence, courts tend to focus directly on a defendant‘s copying —
determining its extent (similarity), relevance to the plaintiff‘s work (substantiality), etc.—
and often lose sight of the fact that as a preliminary, they need to determine the existence
of the entitlement, originating at the point of the work‘s creation. In the process, the
point of creation—the time at which the law presumes its exclusive rights to vest in the
creator— tends to be altogether ignored. The near-exclusive focus on copying, results in
the inquiry becoming largely about the defendant‘s appropriation and the propriety of it.
The foreseeability test would now have the effect of anchoring the infringement
inquiry in the entitlement-delineation (as opposed to -interference) process, as a
preliminary. By emphasizing that a defendant‘s copying is actionable only if objectively
foreseeable to the plaintiff at the time of creation, it is likely to shift the focus of the
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inquiry away from the present (i.e., the actual copying) to the past (i.e., the creation) in
order to establish the existence of the entitlement. It would thus effectively move
copyright away from its misappropriation-like emphasis to a more nuanced purposedriven one, that recognizes the point at which copyright protection attaches to the work,
and in turn accords it some significance in the overall process.214
None of this is of course, likely to detract from the possibility that courts will
view the post-creation development of new technological uses as ex ante foreseeable
merely because they are presented with the actual use —especially in cases where the
time-lag is very short. As with every foreseeability reconstruction, the problem isn‘t
likely to be eliminated altogether. Yet, the fact that a temporal baseline is identified for
the inquiry (unlike in other contexts), will perhaps mitigate it to some extent. Thus, in the
context of tort law when courts ask whether a certain consequence was foreseeable to the
defendant at the time of his actions, their reference is the ―reasonable man‖, constructed
over time —and therefore imbued with an awareness of the world as it exists at the time
of the decision-maker. Thus, if the defendant‘s negligent action occurred in 1984 —
courts rarely ever set that year as the cut-off point in their construction of the reasonable
man‘s objective foresight. The ‗reasonableness‘ standard is thought to permit the intertemporality of the inquiry. In the copyright context however, the test would place
emphasis on the state of the world in the year that the work was created —off-setting any
potential hindsight influence in situations where the time-lag (between the plaintiff‘s
creation and the defendant‘s actions) is significant. To this extent, it is therefore far less
likely to be influenced by hindsight.
VI. CONCLUSION
Central to much of the preceding argument is the idea that copyright law isn‘t the
best way of allocating windfalls associated with unforeseeable uses. In numerous other
contexts, the law uses foreseeability as a mechanism by which to avoid and re-allocate
these windfalls, in the belief that the costs and benefits associated with them are
incapable of inducing any significant ex ante behavioral modification among individuals.
Given the primacy of these behavioral assumptions across different areas of the common
law, I have attempted to argue here that copyright law should be no different.
To the extent that copyright law continues to rely on a theory of incentives and
the need to provide creators with an incentive to invest time and resources into the
creative process, it too attempts to bring about ex ante behavioral modification among
individuals. If the behavioral assumptions that the common law relies on in a host of
other areas are indeed true, then copyright should find little reason to be different.
Individuals will (and can) not factor the unforeseeable consequences of their actions into
their ex ante reasons for acting. Consequently, limiting copyright‘s grant of exclusivity to
uses of the creative work that were foreseeable to a creator at the time of creation is likely
to better align creators‘ creative decision-making with their incentives. The test of
foreseeable copying, proposed here would thus provide copyright law with a device by
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which to doctrinally instantiate its theory of incentives and simultaneously avoid
misallocating windfalls that the current system lends itself to. Using the idea of bounded
rationality as its basis, it remains premised on providing creators with an incentive that is
tailored to the exact way in which the law presumes individuals to behave in a variety of
other contexts.
For far too long, copyright law and policy have centered around the rhetoric of
incentives and inducements but failed to integrate into doctrine, the way in which they
actually impact human behavior. It is hoped that the present model will contribute
towards enabling the idea of incentives to be more than just of rhetorical significance, or
in the very least, serve to wean copyright away from its reliance on an illusive theory of
creator incentives.

